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PROOF. All first-order formulas over identity can be defined as a Boolean combination of formulas expressing the existence of at least a certain number of elements. By 2.2 these formulas are definable in Y(D). The converse follows from 2.1. As rules of inference it has modus ponens, substitution, and a "necessitation rule" for D:
QED. 2.2. The languages Y(O, D) and Y(O)
.
QED. Let us call a set T of (multi-) modal formulas (frame) categorical if, up to isomorphism, there is only one frame validating T; T is called A-categorical if, up to isomorphism, T has only one frame of power A validating it. (A-) categoricity is an important notion in first-order logic that is meaningless in standard modal
[p =>Dp. If there are any RD-reflexive points, let c be such a point; replace it with two points C1, C2, and adapt RD by putting RDClC2, and conversely, and by putting RDCiW (RDWCi) if RDCW (RDWc) (i = 1, 2). In the resulting structure RD is real inequality, and p is refuted somewhere.
THEOREM 3.2 (Koymans). Let 2: u {cp} c S(D). Then
QED. Hence, one may be inclined to think that DL is the basic logic in $(D), just as K is the basic logic in $(K). However, DU is, so to speak, not as stable as K: in $(K) incompleteness phenomena occur only with more exotic extensions of K (cf. &. Let Z3 -p be some finite set of formulas that is closed under subformulas, and that satisfies KI e Z = Di e Z. We define a nonstandard model ' as follows; let g, W', R', and V' be as in our remarks following 1.7; define RD by RDg(v)g(u) iff, for all Di e g(v), t e g(u). Then, using RD To each modal formula p we associate a set operator FP as follows. Let P1, .. ,k be sets, and let P abbreviate P..._, Pk. Then FPi(P) = Pi (1 < i < k), while, for other nonmodal p, FP is the obvious Boolean set operation. Also, F"P(S1,.. ., Sj) = MR (F0(Sl,. . ., S.)), and FD(p(S1,. . . S") = M (FP(S1,. .. ., S) ). The functions FD4 and FD9 are defined dually. We verify that Z is in fact a p-relation by checking the conditions of 4.6. Condition 1 is trivial. We only check half of condition 2: assume that R1ww' and Zwv, with w, w' e W1 and v e W2. We have to prove 3v' e W2(R2vv' A Zwv'). QED.
QED. 3.2. Logics in Y(O, D) and Y(F, P, D). The basic logic DLm in Y(O, D) is DL + K + (Op -+ p v Dp); its rules of inference are those of DL plus those of K. The basic logic DLt in '(F, P, D) is DL + Kt + (Fp

On Sahlqvist theorems for $(O, D) and $(F, P, D). We start with some preliminary remarks. A formula in $(O, D) is called a Sahlqvist formula if it is
Next we apply 4.7 to obtain a definability result for classes of models. To this end we find it convenient to take frames <E, w> with a distinguished world w (as in Kripke's original publications) as the basic notion of frame. Similarly, the basic notion of model is taken to be <E, w, V>. 
